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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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July 8, 1981

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Executive Registry

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT:

Conventional Arms Transfer Policy

The President has formally approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on conventional arms transfer policy. It should be implemented in accordance with the procedures detailed in my memorandum of May 27, 1981, on arms transfer coordination.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Attachment

cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget

The Deputy Chief of Staff to the President

The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

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WASHINGTON

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July 8, 1981

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 5

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER POLICY

The challenges and hostility toward fundamental United States interests, and the interests of its friends and allies, have grown significantly in recent years. These trends threaten stability in many regions and impede progress toward greater political and economic development.

The United States cannot defend the free world's interests alone. The United States must, in today's world, not only strengthen its own military capabilities, but be prepared to help its friends and allies to strengthen theirs whrough the transfer of conventional arms and other forms of security assistance. Such transfers complement American security commitments and serve important United States object ves. Prudently pursued, arms transfers can strengthen its.

The United States therefore views the transfer of conventional arms and other defense articles and services as an essential element of its global defense posture and an indispensable component of its foreign policy. Applied judicionally, arms transfers can:

- -- help deter aggression by enhancing the states of preparedness of allies and friends;
- -- increase our own armed forces' effectivenes: by improving the ability of the United States, in concert with its friends and allies, to project power in response to threats posed by mutual adversaries;
- -- support efforts to foster the ability of our forces to deploy and operate with those of our friends and all es, thereby strengthening and revitalizing our mutual security relationships;
- -- demonstrate that the United States has an enduring interest in the security of its friends and partners, and that it will not allow them to be at a military disadvantage;

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- -- foster regional and internal stability, thus encouraging peaceful resolution of disputes and evolutionary change; and
- -- help to enhance United States defense production capabilities and efficiency.

Attainment of these objectives in turn requires effective United States Government control and direction over erms transfers. Because of the diversity of United State; security interests, this Administration will tailor its approach to arms transfer requests to specific situations and exercise sufficient flexibility to respond promptly to change; affecting the mutual interests of the United States and its allies and friends. We will review such requests with care.

The United States will evaluate requests primarily in terms of their net contribution to enhanced deterrence and defense. It will accord high priority to requests from its major alliance partners and to those nations with whom it has friendly and cooperative security relationships. In making arms transfer decisions the United States will give due consideration to a broad range of factors including:

- -- the degree to which the transfer responds appropriately to the military threats confronting the recipient;
- -- whether the transfer will enhance the recipient's capability to participate in collective security efforts with the United States;
- -- whether the transfer will promote mutual in erests in countering externally supported aggression;
- -- whether the transfer is consistent with United States interests in maintaining stability within regions where friends of the United States may have differing objectives;
- -- whether the transfer is compatible with the needs of United States forces, recognizing that occasions wil arise when other nations may require scarce items on an emergency basis;
- -- whether the proposed equipment transfer can be absorbed by the recipient without overburdening its military support system or financial resources; and
- -- whether any detrimental effects of the transfer are more than counterbalanced by positive contributions to United States interests and objectives.

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All requests will be considered on a case-by-case bisis. Those for coproduction, or the transfer of sensitive or advanced technology, will receive special scrutiny, taking into account economic and industrial factors for both the United States and other participating countries, the importance of arms cooperation with NATO and other close friends and allies, potential third party transfers, and the projection of sensitive technology and military capabilities.

Particular care must be taken to avoid any adverse impact on allied and friendly nations by encouraging them to a sume burdens for which their economies are ill-prepared. Therefore, careful consideration will be given to lower-cost al ernatives including adaptations of military equipment for sale abroad, recognizing that first-line systems may not suit the needs of many countries. This consideration of the full range of available American alternatives will take place at every stage of review.

United States Government representatives overseas will be expected to provide the same courtesies and assistance to firms that have obtained licenses to market items on the United States Munitions List as they would to those marketing other American products.

The policy changes being initiated should not be seen as heralding a period of unrestrained military transfers. The United States retains a genuine interest in arms transfer restraint and remains prepared to consider specific proposals directed toward that end. There has been, however, little or no interest in arms transfer limitations manifested by the Soviet Union, or the majority of other arms-producin; nations. In the absence of such interest, the United States will not jeopardize its own security needs through a program of unilateral restraint. At the same time, recognizing the special role that its major allies can play in strengthening common friends, it will seek to develop complementary policies with those allies.

The realities of today's world demand that we pursue a sober, responsible, and balanced arms transfer policy, a policy that will advance our national security interests and those of the free world. Both in addressing decisions as to specific transfers and opportunities for restraint among producers, we will be guided by principle as well as practical secessity. We will deal with the world as it is, rather than as we would like it to be.

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This directive supersedes Presidential Directive No. 13 of May 13, 1977, and the Conventional Arms Transfer Folicy Statement by the President of May 19, 1977, which are hereby rescinded.

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THE WHITE HOUSE 2309

WASHINGTON

May 27, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE EDWIN MEESE III Counsellor to the President

THE HONORABLE DAVID STOCKMAN
The Director, Office of Management and Budget

THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER III Chief of Staff to the President

THE HONORABLE EUGENE V. ROSTOW
The Director, Designate, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT:

Arms Transfer Coordination

Under the direction of the President, the Department of State has primary responsibility for the U.S. arms transfer program. Given the importance of this program, close coordination on arms transfer decisions between the Department, together with the other appropriate agencies, and the White House is of great importance.

A proposed arms transfer raising significant bolicy questions must be approved by the President, based on a decision memorandum coordinated with the Department of Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Once the memorandum is raceived at the White House, the National Security Council Staff will coordinate it with appropriate members of the White House Staff and Executive Office of the President.

Arms transfer cases requiring Congressional a otification under the Arms Export Control Act should be cleared through the NSC Staff prior to official notification. These cases will be coordinated with appropriate White House and EOP offices prior to clearance.

These guidelines apply also to situations when a potential purchaser requests approval in principle in advance of Congressional notification. Until specifically authorized, USG representatives should avoid actions or responses that could be interpreted as a commitment.

This memorandum supersedes the May 11, 1981 memorandum on the same subject.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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cc: The Vice President Michael Deaver